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Ex-post simulations of the global coffee model  1990s if the quota system were suspended in
over the recent period of operation of the Inter-  1990. But prices would recover in the second
national Coffee Agreement's export quota  half of the decade as production and exports
system, 1981-86, show the following. The quota  declined in lagged response so the very low
system had a stabilizing effect on world coffee  prices of the first half.
prices in the 198  1-85 period.  In 1986, when
coffee.  prices increased sharply due to the  For 1990-2000 most producing countries
drought in Brazil and the export quotas were  would be better off in total real export revenues
suspended, prices would have been 24 percent  with tht export quota system. But the extent of
higher in the absence of the quotas over the  the benefits vary considerably from one country
1981-85 period.  But the quotas have reduced  to another. Low-cost countries - such as Costa
export revenues (in real terms), except for such  Rica, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Papua New
large producers as Brazil and Columbia. These  Guinea - could more than compensate for the
countries gained from tne scheme because they  lower world prices under the without-quota
face very small or even zero marginal export  situation by large increases in exports.  High-
rvenues  from incnrased exports, due to their  cost countries - such as C6te d'lvoire,  El
large market shares.  Salvador, Ethiopia, and India-  would suffer
both from the lower prices and lower export
In projections of the coffee market, with and  quantities without the export quota scheme. The
without the export quota system, prices would  two largest producers - Brazil and Columbia
be substantially lower during the first half of the  - would also benefit from the extension of the
quota scheme.
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ON THE WORLD  COPFFE WARKET
I.  Introduction
1.  The International  Coffee  Agreement (ICA),  utilizing  an export quota
system,  has been an important  factor  in the international  coffee  market in
recent  years.  The export  quota  scheme  has succeeded  in  keeping  world  coffee
prices  fairly  stable  in  the  most recent  period  of its  operation  (since  October
1980) in spite of wide fluctuations  in world coffee  production. However,
recent criticisms against the  quota  system, especially from  consuming
countries,  have been intense.  The major reasons for the frustration  of
consuming countries are  (i) inflexibility  in allocation  of quotas among
producing  countries  and among  coffee  varieties  and (ii)  the sales  to the  non-
member  countries  at large  price  discounts. The  current  Agreement  is to  expire
in September  1989  and discussions  are already  underway  among  the  ICA  members
for the  negotiation  of a new agreement. Because  of the  wide differences  of
opinion over the  unresolved issues, there is a  fairly high degree of
uncertainty  about whether  a new agreement  will come into force in October
1989.
2.  Given  this  uncertainty,  it is of interest  to assess  the impact  the  ICA
has had in the past  and could  have in the future  on the  world  coffee  market
and on each of the  major  exporting  countries. For  this  purpose  a new  global
econometric  model  of the  coffee  economy  was  built. This  paper  presentsthe  model  and  some  simulation  results  based  on  assumptions  of an industry  with
and  without  the  quota  system.
II.  Recent  Developments  in  the  World  Coffee  Market  and  the  ICA
3.  The first international  coffee  agreement  came into force in October
1963 with the  main aim of halting  a declining  price  trend.  Its main market
regulatory  instrument  was an  export  quota system.  The quota system  was
discontinued  in  1973  because  producing  and  consuming  countries  could  not  agree
on the  price  and  quota  levels.
4.  World coffee prices were at historically  low levels in the early
1970s. When  an extremely  serious  frost  hit  Brazil  in 1975,  prices  skyrocketed
to reach  US¢379/kg  in 1977. After  1977  prices  declined  sharply  and  this  sharp
decline prodded producing  and  consuming  countries  into negotiating  a new
agreement  with  an export  quota  system  as its  main  economic  provision.
5.  The export  quota  system  was quite successful  in keeping  a floor  under
prices between  October 1980 and February  1986, when the quota system  was
suspended. The suspension  was triggered  by a sharp  increase  in  prices  caused
by a forecasted  reduction  in Brazil's  1986/87  crop  as a consequence  of a very
severe  drought  in 1985.  Prices  declined  steadily  after  the spring  of 1986,
which  led  to  prolonged discussions  among  ICA members and  the  eventual
reinstatement  of the  quota  system  in  October  1987.- 3  -
6.  When the export  quota system  is operative,  the global  quota  and each
exporting  member's  quota  are  determined  at the  beginning  of each  international
coffee  year (October  to September). Exporting  members  (covering  over 95%  of
world  exports)  can  export  only up to thm&,r  quota  levels  to importing  members
(covering  between  85% and 90% of world imports).  The quotas  are adjusted
frequently,  depending  on the relationship  between  world  prices  and the price
range  set  under  the  Agreement. When the  quota  system  is  not operative  there
are  no constraints  on  members'  exports.
7.  There are no restrictions  on exports  from exporting  members to non-ICA
importing  members  (non-quota  market). The  non-quota  market  countries  consist
of New Zealand,  the USSR and other centrally  planned  economies  of Eastern
Europe axcept  Yugoslavia,  and all developing  countries  except  Portugal  and
Greece.  No consistent  and reliable  data exist on prices  in the non-quota
markets.  Some ICA  exporting  members  burdened  with large  stocks  are reported
to have given as much as 50% discount  to quota  market  prices.  It is also
known that many transactions  with the non-quota  market countries  involve
barter  trade.  Attempts  to penalize  these  discounted  sales  have been  made by
the  ICO  but  with  limited  success.
III. Description  of the  Model  and  Validation
8.  Specifications  of  commodity  models vary greatly,  depending on the
purposes  for which the modrls  are designed--short-term,  long-term,  global,
country-specific,  etc.  The present  model was built to analyze the global
market as well as the coffee  sectors  of major producing  countries,  and to- 4 -
undertake  analysis of the operation  of the ICA over the long run.  The
specification  of this  model  differs  from  the  earlier  World  Bank  model  (Akiyama
and  Duncan, 1982), especially in  the  way  in  which  world  prices are
determined.  In solving  for wc id prices the present  model searches  for a
price  that equilibrates  export  supply  and import  demand  in the  quota  market.
In the earlier model price was solved  as a function  of stocks  and world
demand.
9.  The  new  model  also  incorporates  a simple  version  of the  vintage  capital
approach  to the specification  of the supply  response  (Akiyama  and Trivedi,
1987). In this  specification,  supply  of all the  major  producing  countries  is
determined  in two  stages--at  planting  and at harvesting. The  model  also  uses
country-specific  retail prices in the demand  equations for all the major
consuming  ICA-member  countries  and country-specific  farmgate  prices in the
supply  equations  for  all  the  major  producing  countries.
10.  The basic structure  of the model is depicted  in the flow charts  of
Figures  1 and  2.  The  model  consists  of  a supply  block  (Figure  1)  and  a demand
block  (Figure  2).  The  supply  block  models  new  plantings,  production,  domestic
consumption  and  exports  for  31  countries/regions.  The  demand  block  models
demand in  22 ICA-importing  member countries.  (The non-quota market is
exogenous  to the  model).
11.  When the export  quota system  is operative,  global  and member-country
exports  to the  quota  market  are  fixed. When the  quota  system  is  not  operative
the  exports  of each  country/region  are  determined  by production,  domesticFigure  1: SUPPLY  BLOCK  OF  THE  MODEL
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consumption  and  carry-over  stocks  of these  countries/regions  and  are
responsive  to world prices.  World prices,  proxied  by the ICO "Other  Milds"
Indicator  Price,  are  determined  by equating  export  supply  to import  demand  in
the quota  market.  This price-determination  algorithm  is used both  when the
quota  system  is  operative  and  when it is  not.
Supply  Block
12.  For  each  producing  country,  behavioral  equations  were  estimated  for  new
plantings, production,  domestic consumption, total  ,exports  and  farmgate
prices.  Identity equations  are also used to define or link endogenous
variables. The  equations  consist  of the  following:
RFGPt  =  f (EXt,  CPIt,  WPtP...)  Behavioral  (1)
NPt  =  f (RFGPt,  RFGPt_ji,..  )  Behavioral  (2)
PCAPt  =  f (NPt,  NPt-l*'  YLD...  Identity  (3)
PDt  =  f  (PcAPt,  RFGTt...)  Behavioral  (4)
DCt  =  f  (EXt,  CPIt,  POPt,  GDPt,  WPt...)  Behavioral  (5)
ESt  = PDt  + EStl1  - DCt  -Xt  Identity  (6)
XAVt =  PDt + ESt_1 - DCt  Identity  (7)
Xt=  f (XAVt,  WPt,  EXt,  CPIt,  .... )  Behavioral  (8)
XMt  =  xt - XNmt  Identity  (9)where:
RFGP  = Farmgu,e  price  in real  local  currency  terms.
EX  =  Exchange  rate  vis-a-vis  US dollar.
CPI  =  Consumer  Price  Index.
WP  =  World  coffee  price,  ICO  "Other  Milds"  Indicator  Price.
NP  =  Net  change  in number  of "bearing  trees"  (USDA,  Foreign  Agriculture
Service:  Coffee)  from  one  year  to the  next.
PCAP  =  Production  potential  based  on existing  trees  and  estimated  yields.
YLD  =  Yield per hectare.
PD  =  Production.
DC  =  Domestic  consumption.
POP  =  Population
GDP  =  Real  Gross  Domestic  Product.
ES  =  Year-end  stocks.
X  = Total  export  quantity.
XAV  =  Export  availability.
XM  =  Exports  to  quota  market.
XNM  =  Exports  to non-quota  market.-9-
13.  Specification  of production  is based on a vintage-capital  production
approach. First,  new  plantings  are  determined  by recent  real  farmgate  prices,
which in turn are a function  of exchange  rates,  inflation  and world  prices.
New and past plantings  with yield  determine  production  capacity. Production
is a function  of production  capacity,  recent  real farmgate  prices  and other
variables  such  as  weather  and  the  biennial  production  cycle.
14.  Domestic  demand equations in exporting  countries  are a function  of
world price, inflation  rate, exchange rate, population  and GDP.  Export
availability  is defined  as production  plus carry-over  sto.cks  minus domestic
consumption. Export  availability,  world price,  exchange  rate and inflation
determine  total  exports. Finally,  exports  to the  quota  market  are  defined  as
total  exports  minus  exports  to the  non-quota  market. Exports  to the  non-quota
market  are  exogenous. As discussed  above,  when the  quota  system  is  operative,
exports  to the  quota  market  also  become  ePogenous.
15.  There are 31 individual  countries/tegions  modelled  as ICA-exporting
countries. They are Costa  Rica,  Dominican  Republic,  El Salvador,  Guatemala,
Honduras,  Nicaragua,  Mexico,  Rest of Central  America  and Carribean,  Brazil,
Colombia,  Peru,  Ecuador,  Venezuela,  Rest  of South  America,  Cameroon,  Burundi,
Ethiopia,  Kenya,  Madagascar,  Rwanda,  Tanzania,  Uganda,  C6te  d'Ivoire,  Angola,
Zaire,  Rest of Africa,  India,  Indonesia,  Philippines,  Rest of Asia and Papua
New  Guinea.- 10  -
Demand Block
16.  The  total  quota-market  demand  is  defined  as the  sum  of demand  in 22 ICA
importing  member countries.  For each country,  demand is specified in a
conventional  manner,  i.e.,  on a per capita  basis  with  real income  per  capita,
population,  taste and real retail prices  as explanatory  variables.  Real
retail  prices,  in turn,  are a function  of exchange  rates,  inflation  and  world
prices.  A time  trend is used as a proxy  for taste  change.  The 22 countries
modelled  as ICA importing  countries  are the United States,  Canada,  Federal
Republic  of Germany,  France,  United  Kingdom,  Italy,  Portugal,  Spain,  Greece,
Belgium,  Netherlands,  Ireland,  Switzerland,  Austria,  Denmark,  Sweden,  Norway,
Finland,  Yugoslavia,  Japan,  Australia  and  New  Zealand.
Parameters  and  Elasticities  in  the  Model
17.  A large  number  of parameters  and elasticities  were estimated  and used
in  the  model. Those  for  supply  and  import  demand  are  discussed  here.
(i)  Supply
18.  Depending on availability  and reliability  of data, there are four
categories  of supply  specification  in  the  model. They  are:- 11  -
(a) For  Colombia,  equations describing  new  plantings,
stumping,  production  capacity  of old trees and production
were  established.  1/
(b) For ten  countries,  equations  describing  net  new plantings
and production  were  estimated. The countries  specified  in
this  way  are  Costa  Rica,  Guatemala,  the  Dominican  Republic,
Honduras,  Mexico,  Brazil,  C6te d'Ivoire,  Kenya,  India  and
Indonesia.
(c)  For 15 countries  and regions,  simple  supply  equations
were specified  due  to lack  of success  in the  estimation  of
new planting  equations  or the  unavailability  of tree  stock
data.  They are the El Salvador,  Nicaragua,  Ecuador,  Peru,
Rest-of-South  America,  Cameroon,  Burundi,  Ethiopia,
Madagascar,  Rwanda,  Tanzania,  Zaire,  The  Philippines,  Rest-
of-Asia,  and  Papua  New  Guinea.
More  detailed  analysis  was  possible  for  Colombia,  because  of the
availability  of reliable  data  from  the  Federation  de Cafecultores  on new
plantings,  stumping  and stock  of  old trees.- 12 -
(d)  For five countries  and regions,  production  is exogenous.
They are  Venezuela,  Uganda, Angola, Rest-of-Africa  and
Rest-of-Central  America.  1/
19.  In terms of world production  shares, the countries for which the
vintage-capital  approach  was used (countries  which fall into categories  (a)
and (b) above) cover about 70%.  Equations (1)-(4)  above constitute  the
components  of  supply for these countries.  Table la presents the price
elasticities  of  new plantings  for  the  countries  in categories  (a)  and  (b).
20.  For countries  in category  (c), no account  was taken  of tree stocks.
For these  countries,  it was assumed  that tree stocks  or production  potential
change  with time,  and  prices  affect  production  only  in the  short  term,  i.e.,
PDt  =  f (TM  ,  RFCPt,  RFCPt1.. )  (10)
1/  For  these  countries,  production  was  taken  to be exogenous  due  to the
unsatisfactory  results  obtained  from  attempts  to  estimate  supply
equations. However,  due  to the  small  role  these  countries  play  in the
world  market  we do not  believe  that  this  reduces  the  effectiveness  of the
model.- 13  -
Table la:  PRICE  ELASTICITIES  OF NEW PLANTINGS
Country  t-1  t-2  t-3  t-4












Brazil  1.02  2.34
(2.06)  (7.72)
Cbte d'lvoire  4.19
(2.52)





(2.67)- 14  -
21.  Short-,  medium-  and  long-term  supply  elasticities  are  given  in  Table  lb
for  most  of  the  countries in  categories (a) (b)  and  (c). 1/  These
elasticities  were  derived  from  model  simulations.  As  discussed  by Akiyama  and
Trivedi  (1987),  the  price  elasticity  of  supply  is  not  time-invariant.
Elasticities  tend to be high in countries  where  general  economic  and coffee
policies  have  been  stable  and  where  data  are  reliable.  2/
(ii) Net Import  Demand
22.  Net import  equations  are specified  in double-log  form except  for the
Federal  Republic  of Germany,  Italy,  Netherlands,  Great Britain,  Australia,
Au.stria  and  Japan. For  these  countries,  they  are specified  as,
NMt  =  aO  +  alP  +  a2 lnYt  (11)
where: NM =  Net  imports  per  capita
P  =  Real  retail  price
Y  = Real  GDP  per  capita
1/  Prices  were  not  significant  in the  new  plantings  and supply  equations  for
Honduras  and  Mexico.
2/  In countries  where  data  on new  plantings  and  production  are  unreliable,
estimates  of price  elasticities  tended  to  be statistically  insignificant
and  low.- 15  -
Table  lb:  ELASTICITIES OF SUPPLY  IN  SELECTED  COUNTRIES
'iears  After  Price  Change
Two  Years  Five  Years  Ten  Years
Brazil  0.03  0.10  0.36
Burundi  0.03  0.47  0.95
Cameroon  0.04  0.14  0.16
Colombia  0.16  0.44  0.74
Costa  Rica  0.11  0.15  0.41
C8te  d'Ivoire  0.55  0.68  0.84
Dominican  Republic  0.19  0.34  0.78
Ecuador  0.11  0.13  0.14
El Salvador  0.13  0.15  0.16
Ethiopia  0.06  0.15  0.19
Guatemala  0.13  0.13  0.20
Hondur-q  0.13  0.15  0.20
India  *  0.09  0.10  0.15
lIdonesia  0.14  0.17  0.25
Kenya  0.04  0.14  0.45
Nexico  0.02  0.06  0.13
Papua  New  Guinea  0.07  0.18  0.18
Philippines  0.06  0.18  0.20
Zaire  0.02  0.15  0.17- 16  -
This  specification  was  used  because  in these  countries  income  elasticities  are
observed  to decline  with per  capita  net imports.  1/  Average  income  and  price
elasticities  of demand  for the  estimated  period  1968-86  2/ are given  in  Table
2. 3/
Evaluation  of Ex-Post  Simulation  Results
23.  The  model  was  run for  the period  1974-84  and the results  compared  with
the  actual  values.  The simulation  results  and the  actual  values  for  the ICO
"Other  Milds"  Indicator  Price,  world  production  and  total  exports  to the  quota
markets  are given in Figures  3-5.  As these figures  show, the fit to the
actual  values  are very good and the  model  captures  all the  important  turning
points. The  differences  between  the  simulated  and  actual  values  for
1/  Income  elasticity  is given  by  a2/NMt.  Thus  it  declines  with  NMt.
2/  The  crop  year  used  in producing  countries  varies  from  one  country  to
another  in  terms  of starting  date.  For  example,  Colombia's  crop  year  is
the  same  as the  international  year  which  starts  on 1  October,  but  Brazil's
crop  year  starts  on 1 July.  In  this  paper  the  production  year  refers  to
the  ending  year  unless  otherwise  specified,  e.g.,  Brazil's  production  for
the  1987/88  crop  year  is referred  to as  Brazil's  1988  crop. All  exports
are  on the  international  coffee  year  basis,  thus  exports  for  the  period
October  1987-September  1988  are  referred  to  here  as exports  of 1988.
3/  Income  elasticities  for  some  countries  such  as Japan  and Ireland  were
found  to  be very  high. This is  due  to the  low  per-capita  consumption
levels  in these  countries  in the  1960s  and  early  1970s.- 17 -
Table 2:  DEMAND ELASTICITIES
Importing  Importing
Countries  Income  Price  Countries  Income  Price
Belgium  0.36  -0.28  United States  N.S. /a  -0.46
Denmark  0.58*  -0.43  Australia  1.72  -0.37
Prance  0.68  -0.13  Austria  1.30  -0.54
Federal Republic
of Cermany  0.98  -J.17  Canada  0.28  -0.13
Greece  0.52  -0.49  Finland  0.34  -0.08
Ireland  2.89  -0.34  Japan  2.03  -0.31
Italy  0.92  -0.18  Norway  0.26  -0.14
Netherlands  0.89  -0.34  Sweden  N.S.  -0.29
Portugal  0.62  -0.28  Switzerland  0.56 *  -0.24
Spain  1.07  -0.07  *  Yugoslavia  N.S.  N.S.
United Kingdom  1.26  -0.51  New Zealand  1.28  -0.13
Selected Producing  Countries  Income  Price /b
Hcwador  0.40  -0.08
Mexico  N.S.  -0.14
Brazil  N.S.  -0.09
Colombia  0.41  -0.14
India  0.24  N.S.
Indonesia  N.S.  -0.07
Dominican Republic  N.S.  -0.08
/a  Statistically  not significant.
/b  Note that due to the unavailability  of retail  price data for these
countries,  the international  coffee  price in terms  of local  currencies
and deflated  by the local CPI  was used.  Therefore,  the price
elasticities  presented  here should  be underestimates  of the demand
response  to changes  in retail prices.
*  Significant  at 10% level  of significance. All others significant  at 5%
level of significance.FIGURE  3:  Actual  and  Simulation  Results
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the  total  exports  to the  quota  markets  are  zero  for  the  period  1981-85  because
in the  simulation  run  these  values  are  exogenous.
24.  Some test statistics  for these  variables  are given in Table 3.  The
root-mean-squared-percentage  error for the price is only 4.3% and that for
world  production  only  1.4%.
Table  3:  TEST  STATISTICS  FOR  THE  EX-POST  SIMULATION  RUN
ICO "Other  Milds"  World  Total  Exports  to
Indicator  Price  Production  The  Quota  Market
Mean  % Absolute  Error  5.4  1.1  0.9
Root  Mean  Squared  % Error  4.3  1.4  1.4
IV.  Ex-Post  Simulation  Results  of the  Model  With  and  Without  the  ICA
25.  In  order  to  evaluate  the  effects  of the  ICA,  the  model  was  run  with  the
quotas  (factual)  and  without  the  quotas  (counter-factual)  for  the  period  1981-
86.  The simulation  results  for  some  of the  key  variables  are  given  in  Figures
6-8.
26.  To allow examination  of the market stabilizing  effects  of the ICA,
variances  of these  key variables  are given .n  Table  4.  The results  show  the
significant  price  stabilization  effects  the  ICA  had  during  the  period  1981-FIGURE  6:  Factual  vs.  Counterfactutl  Simulations
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85.  An interesting  result  is the  ICA's  price  stabilizing  effect  in 1986  when
the  quota  system  was not in force. The  explanation  for  this  is that  when the
quota  system  was in force  during  the  period  1981-85,  many producing  countries
were forced  to accumulate  stocks. When the  quotas  were lifted  in 1986,  these
sttocks  were released  which pushed  prices  down.  The si.nulation  results  show
that had the quotas  not been in force for the period  1981-85,  total stocks
held in  producing  countries  at the  end  of 1985  would  have  been  22  million  bags
instead  of an actual  33 million  bags.  The  results  also show  that  exports  to
the  quota  market  would  have  been  55  million  bags  in 1986  instead  of the  actual
62.5 million  bags had the quota system  been non-operative. Thus the quota
system  had  a significant  effect  in  reducing  world  prices  in 1986.  If there  had
been  no quota  scheme  during  the  period  1981-85,  world  coffee  prices  would  have
been 24X higher in 1986.  This result would not have been found if the
simulation  was  performed  over  only  a short  period.
27.  The  results  in  Table  4  also show  that  under  the  quota  system  exports  to
the quota market  were more unstable  than  without  the quota;  but total real
export revenues  were more stable.  In other words,  under the quota system
total  exports  are  adjusted  to stabilize  prices  and  this  results  in stabilizing
export  revenues.
28.  In order to evaluate  the costs  and benefits  of the quota system  for
injor  producing  countries,  factual  and  counter-factual  simulatiun  results  were
compared. Originally,  an atttempt  was made to calculate  economic  welfare  of
individual  countries. However,  as discussed  in the  Annex,  it  was found  to be
very  difficult  to calculate  these. Thus,  comparisons  were  made only  for  real
export  revenues. The  deflator  used  was the  World  Bank's  MUV.  Also  it  was- 26  -
Table  4:  VARIANCES  OF KEY  VARIABLES  WITH  AND  WITHOUT  THE  EXPORT  QUOTAS;
1981-85  AND 1981-86
Total  Export
Quantity  to  Total  Real
the  Quota  Market  Export  Revenue  /a
World  Prices  With  Without  With  Without
Dates  With  Quota  Without  Quota  Quota  Quota  Quota  Quota
1981-85  31.5  182.5  7.3  1.0  1,496  3,622
1981-86  584.9  2,142.8  10.4  1.5  3,490  9,762
/a  Deflated  by World  Bank's  MUV.
assumed  that sales  on the  non-quota  market  were  made at prices  30Z  less  than
in  the  quota  market.
29.  Total  export  revenues  in 1985  constant  dollar  terms  for total  exports
and  for  individual  country  exports  under  the  quota  and  without-quota  scenarios
are given  in Table 5.  For the  total  of real export  revenues  there  is  hardly
any  difference  for  the  period  1981-85. However,  if 1986  is  included  the  world
total  would  have been 4.7Z higher  if the  quota  system  had not  existed  during
the period  1981-85.  As discussed  above,  this is because  world  prices  would
have  been  higher  in 1986  had  the  quotas  not  existed  in the  period  1981-85.
30.  For individual  countries  it is interesting  to note that most of the
small  exporters  would  have been better-off  in terms of real  export  revenues
without the quotas.  But large exporters  such as Brazil,  Colombia  and Cate
d'Ivoire  are among  the  few  countries  that  gained  from the  quota  system. When
large countries increase their  exports world  prices  decline--often  to  the- 27  -
Table  5:  TOTAL REAL EIORT  REVENUES  (1981415/16)
Coontry  Date  Quota  Ib  Qota  I  I  DlftarC  /a
I-lllln  of  coasteot  1985 US$--__----
World Total  1981-85  54.869  55I 115  -0.5
World  Total  1981-86  69,828  75,081  .4.7
Costa  RIca  1981-85  1445  1524  -5.5
Costa  Rica  1981-86  1781  1942  -9.1
El  Salvador  1981.85  2230  2184  2.1
tl  Salvador  1981-86  2781  2952  -3.6
G..tatala  1981-8s  1947  1978  -1.6
Goateaola  1981-86  2468  2627  -6.4
bad-ras  1981-8S  942  969  -2.9
Hotduras  1981-86  1278  1587  -8.5
NarItao  1981-85  2166  2261  -4.4
Ibelco  1981-8b  sool  5302  -10.0
NicareQoh  1981-85  721  737  -2.5
MiCeaQoa  1981-86  859  909  -5.9
Colnbla  1981-85  8271  8114  i.0
Cobl  bla  1981-86  10876  11558  -4.4
tatacuala  1981-85  57  55  S.0
Veazoela  1981-86  125  144  .15.7
Cameroon  1981-85  1597  1353  5.l
Caa-rooc  1981-86  1809  1867  -3.2
Etnlople  1981-85  1252  1225  0.7
Etalopla  1981-86  1508  1567  -S.9
Cote  dv-olra  1991-85  5726  5659  1.8
Cota  d'Iaolra  1981-86  4712  4697  -5.7
Kenac  1981-85  1505  150D  0.4
K..y.  1981-86  1769  1878  -6.2
voleda  1991-85  2172  2081  4.7
UQ4ada  1981-86  2712  2755  -1.6
2Z1re  1981-85  1018  976  4.1
Za1re  1981-86  IS14  1595  -S.5
IndIa  1981-85  1050  1IS5  -8.1
IndIa  1981-86  1453  1615  -12.6
Doniolcas  RapoD1IC  1981-85  485  581  -20.0
0aeIaIc  0.P.b6  IC  1981-86  773  772  0.2
Br,aIl  1981-85  1S568  15191  2.4
BrazIl  1981-86  17979  18527  -1.9
Ecuador  1981-85  1198  1516  -9.8
Euador  1981-86  1661  1757  -5.8
Peru  1981-85  748  869  -14.8
Pert  1981-86  1091  1118  -2.5
8u.-di  1991-85  427  459  -7.5
8urundl  1981-86  604  599  0.7
Madagascar  1981-85  776  785  -0.9
Vadagacar  1981-86  991  1041  -5.1
R.eada  1981-85  446  452  -1.4
Rnaoda  1981-86  638  665  -4.0
taccanl  1981-85  776  809  -4.2
Tlazaala  1981-86  97S  1029  -5.8
Angola  1981-85  408  420  -3.0
Anqola  1981-86  444  487  -9.0
Indonola  1981-85  S532  5588  -7.8
Iadon  sls  1981-86  4550  5055  -10.7
PsIllDDplaW  1981-85  594  457  -16.2
PhIl.lIpDoIa  1981-86  595  586  1.6
Papaa  IN  GuInea  1981-85  660  662  -0.2
PApUa me.  OJaI  n  1981-86  854  914  -7.0
/a  NqatIW  Indlcata  lou  r  total  loor?  revboa  In  It  *  19h-cuOta  cane.- 28  -
extent  that  marginal  export  revenues  are  small  or even  zero.
31.  A  qualification  has  to be made about the interpretation  of  these
results.  It was assumed  when the counter-factual  runs were  made that there
would  be no changes  in government  policies  on production. In  many producing
countries,  export taxes on  coffee are  reported to be high because the
governments  wanted  to suppress  production  so there  would  not be large  stocks
accumulated  under  the quota system,  i.e.,  export  taxes  are necessary  because
of the implementation  of the quota system.  If this is the case, in the
counter-factual  case  some  of these  countries  could  have  had  lower  export  taxes
on  coffee and  consequently  larger production  and exports than what the
simulation  results  indicate--and  therefore  world  prices  would  have  been  lower.
However,  it may be in the large  countries'  interests  to increase  export  taxes
when  there  is  no global  export  quota. Therefore,  it is  not  clear  what  the  net
impact  on production,  exports  and  price  would  be if  we allow  for  export  taxes
being  endogenous.
V.  Ex-Ante  Simulation  Results  of the  Model  With  and  Without  the  ICA
32.  The  model  was run ex-ante  to project  the world  coffee  market  with  and
without the ICA  quota system.  Assumptions  used for the main exogenous
variables  in the  model  are:
(i)  Purchasing  power parity is assumed to hold for the projected
period.  To implement  this assumption,  all exchange  rates  were
kept  at their  average  for  1987  and  the  inflation  rate  at 0%.- 29 -
(ii)  Population  increases  at the rate given  in the  World  Development
Report  of 1988.
(iii) CDP in industrial  countries  increases  at an average  rate  of 2.5%
p.a. and that of developing  countries  increases  at an average
rate  of 4.5%.
(a)  Projections  with the  quotas
33.  The  assumption  was made  that the  ICA export quota system will
continue  through  2000 and that the global  quota  will increase  at a rate of
about 1.5% p.a. for the period  1989-2000--which  approximates  the projected
demand  growth  rate of total import  demand  of the importing  ICA members  when
prices are about US¢200/kg  in terms of 1985 constant  dollars.  Non-quota
imports  are  assumed  to increase  at about  2.6%  p.a.--a  slightly  lower  rate  than
the long-term  trend  of demand  in these  countries  as consumption  growth  rates
usually  decline  with  higher  per  capita  consumption  levels. The total  domestic
demand  growth  rate  in producing  countries  is projected  to be 2.3%  p.a.,  which,
with the export  demand  growth  rate,  gives total  world  demand  growth  of about
12t  p.a.  Projections  for key variables  under the quota and without-quota
F4renarios  are  given  in  Figures  9 to 12.
34.  Under  these  assumptions,  world  coffee  prices  in 1985  US dollar  terms
are projected to be about US¢210/kg  until the early 1990s and show some
decline to the USc205/kg level in the late 1990s.  World production  is
projected  to increase  at only about 1.2Z p.a. for the period  1985-2000  but
this will  be sufficient  to meet  the  expected  demand  increase  because  presentFIGURE  9:  Forecasts  with  and  without  Quotas
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world production--taken  as the base year for calculating  growth rates--is
considerably  higher  than  world  consumption. The  model  shows  that  the  world's
three  largest  coffee  producers,  Brazil,  Colombia  and Indonesia,  will increase
their  production  at  about  2X p.a.  An important  reason  for  their  high  expected
production growth rates  is the  high  rate of  real depreciation  of  the
currencies  of these  countries  (about  30%) that took place  over  che  last  five
years.  However,  production  in many other countries  such  as C6te d'Ivoire,
Ethiopia,  Madagascar,  El Salvador,  Nicaragua,  Dominican  Republic  and  Haiti,  is
projected  to decline,  or at best stagnate,  due to overvaluation  of their
currencies  or to the  very  lin.ited  rate  of  new plantings  in the  recent  past  due
to various  reasons  such  as low  real  producer  prices.
35.  To evaluate  the impact  on  world  prices  of different  GDP growth  rates
in importing  countries  and different  global  export  quota growth rates,  two
additional  simulation  runs were made with the coffee  model.  One had GDP
growing  at 0.5% p.a. lower than the base case and the global  export  quota
increasing  at 1.7% p.a.,  the other  had the GDP growing  at 0.5% p.a. higher
than the base case  and the  global  quota  increasing  at 1.3%  p.a.  The  results
are  given  in  Table  6.
36.  As  the  simulation  results in Table 6  show, the differences  in
projected  prices  widen  substantially  with time.  The large  price  differences
under  the  two  scenarios  are  a result  of the low  price  elasticities  of demand.
Thus prices  are considerably  higher  when the secular  demand  trend  is  higher
and the quotas  lower.  The figures  in Table 6 also suggest  that  real  world
coffee  export  revenues  are likely  to increase  at a very modest  rate in the
1990s--about  1.5% p.a. in the base case and 2.3% p.a. in the "Higher  GDP
-rowth  and  lower  quotas"  case.- 35  -
Table  6:  PROJECTED  PRICES  a/  UNDER  ALTERNATIVE  SCENARIOS
Base Case  Higher  GDP  Growth  Lower GDP  Growth  Without  Quotas
Year  and Lower Quotas  and  Higher  Quotas  from  1990
-----------------------  (1985 USf/kg)-/b------------------
1988  213  (97)  c/
1989  211  (96)  212  (96)  210  (95)
1990  211  (96)  214  (97)  208  (94)  137 (62)
1995  204  (93)  220  (100)  179  (81)  183  (83)
2000  205  (93)  234  (106)  167 (76)  200  (91)
a/  100  Other  Milds"  Indicator  Price  In  1985 pr'ces.
b/  Deflator  used  Is  MUV  of  the  World  Bank.
c/  Figures  In  brackets  are  USt/lb.
(b)  Projections  without  the  quotas
37.  Under  this scenario  it was assumed  that the ICA export  quota  system
will be  suspended  from 1990 through 2000.  The projections  for the key
variables  are  also  given  in Figures  9 through  12.
38.  A major difference  between  the simulation  results  for the  with-  and
without-quota  situations  is in the projected  prices. As expected,  prices  are
projected  to be lower  where  there  are  no quotas.  The  extent  of the  price  fall
in 1990 is  especially  severe  as accumulated  stocks  in  producing  countries  are
projected to  be  released in that year.  However, with time the price
differences  narrow.  This is because  the very low prices  during  the period- 36  -
1990-1994  discourage  production;  hence,  by the late 1990s  exports  and prices
are  not  very  different  from  the  quota  case.  In the  absence  of quotas,  however,
the coffee  cycle  would extend  into the  21st century,  with the  higher  prices
after 1995 giving  rise to increased  plantings  and resulting  in lower  prices
after the year 2000.  The extent  and speed  of price  recovery  after the  very
low prices of  1990 depends on the size and lagged nature of the price
elasticities  of supply  in major  coffee-producing  countries. At the  extreme,
if the price  elasticities  of supply  in these  countries  were near  zero,  world
prices  would  not recover  quickly.  The shape  of the  price  recovery  path  also
depends on government  policies taken in major producing  countries.  The
simulation  results  given here assume that changes in world prices  will be
passed  to producers  to the  same  extent  as in the  past  20 years  or so.  It is
also assumed that the stocking  behavior  of these  countries  is the same as
their  pre-1981  behavior. However,  if  governments  in producing  countries  take
policies  such as real devaluations  or reductions  in export  taxes  or both,  it
would  have the  same  effect  as if world  prices  fell  little. There  would  be no
price  recovery  because  world  production  would  not  fall.
39.  Production  and exports  under the non-quota  scenario  vary from one
country  to another.  The simulation  results show countries  following  three
types  of production/exports  path.  They  are:
40.  Category I.  These countries consistently  export  more under the
without-quota  scenario  than  under  the  quota  scenario. The reason  for  this  is
that  they  are  able  to increase  production  capacity  even  with low  world  prices-
-mainly  due to  the low  cost  of production  or of high  real producer  prices.- 37  -
Countries  which fall in this category  are Brazil,  Costa  Rica,  Mexico,  Peru,
Burundi,  Cameroon,  Rwanda,  Tanzania,  Zaire,  Indonesia,  Philippines  and Papua
New  Guinea.  Projected  exports  to the ICA  members  under  the  two  scenarios  for
Brazil,  Costa  Rica,  Burundi,  Uganda,  Indonesia  and  Papua  New  Guinea  are  shown
in  Figures  13 to 18.
41.  Category  II.  These countries  have enough  production  potential  to
export  more in the without-quota  case than in the  quota case.  But the low
world prices  of the early 1990s reduce  production  potential  and by the late
1990s their exports  are less in the without-quota  case than in the quota
case.  Countries  that fall in this category  are Colombia,  Ecuador,  Dominican
Republic,  Guatamala,  Honduras,  Venezuela,  Kenya and Madagascar.  Projected
exports  to the ICA members  under the two scenarios  are given for Colombia,
Honduras  and  Kenya  in  Figure  19 to 21.
42.  Category  III.  These  countries have  hardly enough production
potential  to export  the  quota  quantities  in  1990.  If prices  fall  due to the
quota suspension throughout the  1990s their production  falls and their
production  is projected  to be lower in the without-quota  case than in the
quota case.  El Salvador,  Angola,  C6te d'Ivoire,  Ethiopia  and India  are in
this category  and the projected  exports  to the ICA  members  by C8te  d'Ivoire
and  El Salvador  are  shown  in  Figures  22  and  23.FIGURE  13:  BRAZIL
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VI.  The  Impact  of the  Quota  System
43.  The  expected  impact  for  producing  countries  of the  quota  system  were
estimated  by comparing  projected  export  revenues  in real terms during  the
period  1990-2000  from  the  quota  and  without-quota  simulations  (see  Table  7).
The  quota  system  benefits  the  producing  countries  as  a  whole  by US$2.7  billion
in 1985  constant  US dollars  (or  3.,JZ  increase)  over  this  period  but  as Figure
12 shows  its benefits  decline  with time  and in the late  1990s  the combined
export  revenue  of  coffee-producing  countries  is  higher  under  the  without-quota
scenario.
44.  The  benefits  vary  greatly  from  one  country  to  another.  The  extent  of
the  difference  in a country's  export  revenues  between  the  quota  and  without-
quota case depends  mainly  on the extent  of the difference  in the export
quantities  under the two scenarios.  If a  country  has enough production
potential that it can increase  its expurt  quantities  to cover the loss
incurred  from  lower  world  prices  under  the  without-quota  scenario,  its  export
revenues  would  be  higher  under  the  without-quota  scenario  than  under  the  quota
scenario. Thus  Category  III  and  most of Category  II countries  gain  from  the
quotas  while most countries  in Category  I lose from the quota system;  an
important  exception  in  Category  I is  Brazil,  which  gains  from  continuation  of
the  export  quota  scheme.- 50  -
Table  7:  TOTAL  REAL  EXPORT  REVENUES  (1900-2000)
Country  Quota  Without-Quota  2  Difference  /a
-(millions  of  constant  1985  US$)-
World  Total  85,202  82,456  3.3
Costa  Rica  2475  2830  -14.3
El Salvador  2964  2371  20.0
Guatemala  2819  2509  11.0
Honduras  1459  1408  3.6
Mexico  3876  3514  9.4
Nicaragua  655  560  14.5
Colombia  14795  13328  9.9
Venezuela  173  72  58.2
Cameroon  1816  1972  -8.6
Ethiopia  1570  1272  19.0
CBte  d'Ivoire  4901  3946  19.5
Kenya  2584  2497  3.4
Uganda  2966  2821  4.9
Zaire  1425  1511  -6.1
India  1774  1590  10.4
Dominican  Republic  797  763  4.3
Brazil  24120  22408  7.1
Ecuador  1923  1810  5.9
Peru  1299  1229  5.4
Burundi  723  678  6.3
Madagascar  879  758  13.7
Rwanda  826  . 887  -7.4
Tanzania  1057  1006  4.8
Angola  207  124  40.0
Indonesia  4647  6458  -39.0
Philippines  616  774  -25.7
Papua  New  Guinea  977  1130  -15.7
/a  Negative  indicates  lower  total  export  revenues  in the  with-quota  case.- 51  -
VII.  Policies  to  Cope  with  the  Lower  Prices  in  the  Absence  of  The  Export  Quota
45.  The simulation  results  discussed  in the  last  two sections  show that
real coffee  export  revenues  of many coffee-exporting  countries  would  decline
sharply  if the  quota  system  is suspended  in 1990. For  each  country  there  are
limited  policy  options  available  to cope  with  such  a situation.  In  countries
where  other  cash  crops  are  available,  diversification  out  of  coffee  may  be the
most  appropriate  option. But  this  is  a decision  which  has  to  be  made  within  a
long-run  context,  because  of the  nature  of tree  crop investment. In some
countries  this  option  may  be  desirable  even  if the  quota  syptem  is  continued;
even under  the  quota  scenario  real  export  :evenues  of coffee  are  expected  to
increase  only  at low  rates.
46.  Countries  which  do not  have  the  diversification  option,  may have to
increase  their  competitiveness  in  producing  coffee. This  may  be accomplished
through  employment  of more efficient  production  and processing  technology,
reductions of  export taxes on  coffee and  real devalvation  of  their
currencies.  Some  improved  management  practices,  such  as stumping,  can  improve
yields  in the short  run.  This is not the case  with replanting  of higher-
yielding  varieties  which  has a negative  impact  on farm  incomes  in the short
run.  Because the very low world coffee prices  under the without-quota
scenario could last as  long as four years, governments  might consider
emergency  policies  to reduce  export  taxes or devalue  their  currencies,  or
both-at least  until  coffee  production  technology  improves.  One  catch  in such
a suggestion  is that if all producing  countries  take these  measures,  world
coffee  prices  may  remain  very low  for  a period  considerably  longer  than  that
projected  hete.- 52  -
VIII. Conclusions
47.  The  simulation  results in  this paper gave  se2aral interesting
findings  which  models  foscussed  on short-term  effects  would  not be able to
reveal.  The ex-post  simulation  results  show that the quota system  had an
important  effect  in stabilizing  world  coffee  prices  for the  period  1981-85.
They also show that world  coffee  prices  in 1986,  the year prices  increased
sharply  due  to the  drought  in  Brazil  in 1985,  would  have  been  much  higher  had
the quota system  not operated  during  the period  1981-85.  Thus the quota
system  had a price stabilizing  effect  on the upside  too.  The simulation
results  for individual  exporting  countries  showed  that the quotas led to
decreased  real  export  revenues  for  most  countries,  except  for  large  exporters
like  Brazil  and  Colombia. These  countries  gained  from  the  export  quota  system
because they face very small or even zero marginal  export  revenues  from
increased  exports  due  to  their  large  market  shares.
48.  The projections  of the world  coffee  market,  with and without  the
export  quota  system,  showed  that  world  coffee  prices  would  be substantially
lower  during  the  first  half  of the  1990s  if the  system  were  to  be suspended  in
October  1989.  However,  the  differences  in prices  between  the  quota  and  non-
quota scenarios  narrow  with time as production  and hence exports  in many
countries  decline  due  to  the  low  prices  in  the  early  1990s.
49.  Total  coffee  export  revenues  in real  terms  are projected  to be less
under  the  without-quota  scenario  than  under  the  quota  scenario  until  the  late
1990s;  but in the late 1990s  total  real  export  revenue  is higher  under the
without-quota  scenario  as the  price  differentials  narrow.- 53  -
SO.  For  the  period  1990-2000  most  producing  countries  would  be  better  off
in terms  of total  real  export  revenues  with  the  export  quota  system. However,
the eztent  of the benefits  of the quota system  vary considerably  from one
country  to another.  Countries  with low production  costs could more than
compensate  foiL  the lower  world prices  under the without-quota  situation  by
targe increases  in export  quantities;  while  other  higher-cost  countries  would
suffer  both from the lower  world  prices  and lower  export  quantitites  in the
absence  of the  quota.
Si.  As  the period of lower world prices following suspension  of the
esport  quota scheme is projected  to last for several  years,  countries  with
high  production  costs  may have to consider  reductions  in coffee  export  taxes
or devaluation of  their currency to  reduce the  impact on  their coffee
industry.  However,  if large  producers  followed  this strategy  it would  have  a
depressing  impact  on  world  prices.- 54  -
ANNEX
Problems  in the  Estimation  of Economic  Welfare  Changes
52.  An attempt  was made to calculate  and compare  economic  welfare  under
the quota and without-quota  scenarios.  1/  The estimate  of the economic
welfare  depends  greatly  on the shape  of the supply  curve.  At an extreme,  if
the price elasticity  of  supply is assumed to be zero in the short-run,
producer  surplus  is  reduced  to  export  revenues. However,  this  assumption  is  a
poor  one for  estimating  producer  surplus  as it assumes  that the  same  quantity
of  exports  will  be  made  at any  price,  even if  the  price  drops  down  to  zero.  A
more realistic  export  supply  curve  for the case  when the export  quota  is in
effect  is  the  one  depicted  in  Annex  Graph  1.




1/  The  producer  surpluses  are  derived  from  export  supply  curves  rather  than
from  supply  curves.- 55  -
53.  According  to this  curve,  exports  will  be X only  when prices  are  above
P*.  Below  P ,  exports  will decline  even in the presence  of a quota  fixing
exports  at X
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To calculate  and compare  economic  welfare  under quota  and without-
quota  scenarios,  the  export  supply  curves  under  these  two  scenarios  need  to be
carefully  defined.  In Annex  Graph  2 curve  ACD corresponds  to the  quota  case
and curve ACB to the  without-quota  case.  The calculation  and comparison  of
the producer surpluses for a  small country (price taker) under the two
scenarios  is as follows: Without  the  quota  the  price  is  PNQ,  while  if  quotas
exist  the price  is PQ.  The producer  surplus  under  the  without-quota  scenario
is then PNQGA and under quota P  QECA.  Comparing the two is reduced  to
comparing  the area (i) to area (ii).  In order to calculate  area (ii) one
needs to calculate  P  *.  P* is the price  at which  exporters  would  export  X in- 56 -
the without-quota  scenario.  In order to calculate  P , some constant  price
elasticity  of export  supply  has to be assumed  because  the estimated  supply
elasticities  are not  considered  reliable  when P*  is low.  For selected
countries  the differences  in the producer  surpluses  between the quota and
without-quota  scenarios  for  each  year  for  the  period  1990-2000  were  calculated
and are given in Annex  Table  1.  The assumed  short-term  elasticity  of supply
is 0.3.  Positive  figures  imply  benefits  from  the quota  system  and negative
figures  imply  losses. Among  the selected  countries  only Indonesia,  Papua  New
Guinea, and the Philippines  manage to do better under the without-quota
scenario,  especially  in the long run.  These three  countries  have  managed  to
substantially  expand exports.  All three of  them are considered  low-cost
coffee  producers.
Other than the ad-hoc imposition  of a constant  price  elasticity  of
export supply  and the magnitude  of its elasticity,  there  is a more serious
problem concerning  the economic  welfare calculations  above.  This problem
arises  when  the  supply  curve  shifts  when  quotas  are  lifted.
In Annex Graph 3(a) the export  supply  curve shifts  in and in 3(b)
shifts  outwards  when  export  quotas  are lifted. These  shifts  are  possible  if,
for example,  the stocking  behavior  of exporters  changes  as a result  of the
change  in the  export  quota  regime. In both cases,  the  calculations  of P* and
the areas (i)  and (ii),  as depicted  in Annex  Graph  2, will  not be accurate.
Actually,  for a number  of countries  and for a period  of years,  the P* was
calculated  to be higher  than Pq and PNQ.  In  Annex  Graph  3(a),  the  method  of
comparing  economic  welfare  as depicted  by  Annex  Graph  2 gives  erroneous:  1:  CALCUL,i  IUN  OF  - US  /a IF  ARE L  ItU  /b
Date  Republic  Costa  Rica  Equador  Burundi  Tanzania  Uganda
1987  0  0  0  0  0  0
1988  0  0  0  0  0  0
1989  0  0  0  0  0  0
1990  25.3  2.8  81.2  29.5  47.1  135.8
1991  12.2  8.0  30.1  11.5  19.2  50.4
1992  3.8  3.6  18.2  8.2  11.6  33.5
1993  11.3  15.1  29.7  12.0  16.4  56.9
1994  11.7  20.4  31.8  12.0  16.6  60.6
1995  10.1  17.6  27.0  10.2  14.2  51.3
1996  8.1  14.5  21.2  7.8  10.4  40.4
1997  5.9  9.8  15.5  5.4  6.5  29.7
1998  5.0  9.4  13.4  4.3  5.0  25.8
1999  4.0  7.7  10.6  3.0  3.2  20.4
2000  1.9  3.5  5.4  0.8  -0.1  10.4
%-n
Papua
Date  Zaire  Cameroon  Rwanda  Indonesia  New Guinea  Philippines
1987  0  0  0  0  0  0
1988  0  0  0  0  0  0
1989  0  0  0  0  0  0
1990  46.7  36.5  11.0  -194.3  6.9  3.4
1991  15.1  -3.2  -0.6  -176.7  -6.5  4.4
1992  6.3  -0.8  4.5  40.3  7.5  -7.7
1993  18.4  15.5  10.6  36.7  9.1  1.8
1994  24.6  25.8  10.7  -59.8  6.2  2.1
1995  18.9  25.2  8.7  -79.8  7.3  -0.0
1996  12.5  19.5  7.0  -62.2  3.6  -3.3
1997  7.5  14.0  5.4  -74.2  -0.4  -8.1
1998  6.0  12.9  5.0  -97.1  -1.1  -10.0
1999  3.5  10.7  4.1  -116.4  -2.0  -12.1
2000  -1.4  5.4  2.1  -132.1  -4.7  -15.4
/a  Gain If  sign is negative
/b  In  September 1989.- 58  -
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results.  In Annex Graph  3(b),  producer  gains from  the lifting  of the quota
are  overestimated (if  the  export supply curve  shifts  in  to  AB') or
underestimated  (if  the  export  supply  curve  shifts  outwards  to  AB) as compared
to the  results  obtained  from  the  analysis  leading  to  Annex  Graph  2.
Examination  of the simulation  results  revealed  that, in fact, the
export supply curves of  the majority  of the countries  considered  shifted
substantially  with  time. Thus,  this  approach  was  not  adopted  in  the  paper.
Mathematical  Appendix
In  this  appendix  the  area (ii)  in  Annex  Graph  2 is  calculated.
It is assumed here that the export supply equation  has constant
elasticity,  such  as:
ln X =  e lnP + A  (1)
0
where X =  export
p  =  Price
e  = price elasticity of supply
AO  =  intercept
To  determine  numerically  the intercept,  it is known  that (1)  passes  through
(PNQ'  XNQ) so:- 60  -
AO = lnXNQ  - e ln PNQ  (2)
substituting  (2)  into  (1)
ln X =  n ln P +  ln X NQ - e ln PNQ  (3)
when X =  X ,  then P =  P*.  By substituting X for X and  P* for P into (3) and
solving  for  P*,  an expression  for  P* is  obtained.
P* =  exp  (in  (X IXNQ)/e)  *  PNQ
After  calculating  P*, the  next step  is to calculate  the  area  (ii)  =  (GFC)
in  Annex  Graph  2.  This  area  is equal  to:
(GFC)  =  (P*CG  P  - (PKCFP)  (4)
where:
(P*CGPNQ) =  *NQ  exp (e lnP +  lnXNQ  - e lnPNQ)dp
and:
(PNQ  FCP*)  =  (PNQ  - P*)  X- 61 -
By performing  the  integration,  (4)  becomes:
(GFC)  =  XNQ (PNQ - P*) / [(l+e)  PNQ] - (PNQ  - P*)  (5)
After calculating  the area (GFC)  the producer  surplus  gain from lifting  the
export  quota  becomes:
DIF =  (GFC) - (PQEFPNQ) or,
DIFP=  XNQ (PNQ- P*) / ((l+e) PNQ)  - (P  - p*)  X  (6) NQ Q- 62  -
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